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RECENT DECISIONS
of emergencies, and designed to protect existing tenancies.' 0 This
need for strict construction is also based on the premise that the
emergency laws are a stricture on the common law, and that liberal
interpretations should therefore be avoided.1"
It should also be noted that the issue of the good faith of the
plaintiff in seeking possession is a basic factor.12 In the instant case
that fact was decided favorably for the plaintiff by the jury. Good
faith would seem to assume additional importance in view of the
obvious possibilities for unscrupulous schemes in cooperative arrange-
ments with the present housing conditions.
In general it would seem that the holding of the District of
Columbia court, while being just under the circumstances, cannot be
treated as conclusive of the fact that stockholders should be deemed
owners or landlords of portions of the property held by the coopera-
tive corporation, even under the statutory definitions cited.
D. J. C.
LANDLORD AND TENANT-RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS.-A Wash-
ington, D. C. corporation leased a store upon the defendant's covenant
"that he will use said premises for the sale of alcoholic beverages and
other items usually associated-with the sale of liquor for 'Off Sale'
[Off Premises] consumption and for no other purpose whatsoever."
Defendant subsequently discontinued the operation of the liquor
store. The plaintiff corporation brought action for possession on the
grounds that the covenant had been violated by the discontinuance,
and further alleged that, since the store was in a parking center, its
non-use constituted waste. The corporation's motion for summary
judgment was denied; and, when it elected to stand on its motion,
judgment was given to the defendant. Plaintiff appealed. Held, the
covenant was restrictive and not mandatory. It was for the litigants
to adopt language that would have clearly shown the intent to im-
pose upon the defendant the duty of continuing in possession.
Congressional Amusement Corporation v. Weltnman, 55 A. 2d 95
(Mun. Ct. of App. D. C. 1947).
The plaintiffs argue that the agreement implicitly meant not only
that it would not be used for any other purpose, but that it must be
used. They contend that an unoccupied store is just as undesirable
10 Reconstruction Syndicate v. Sharpe, 186 Misc. 897, 61 N. Y. S. 2d 176
(Mun. Ct. 1946).
II Kristal v. Steinberg, 188 Misc. 500, 69 N. Y: S. 2d 476 (Mun. Ct. 1947).
12 Richelieu Realty Co. v. Mangin, 187 Misc. 440, 63 N. Y. S. 2d 381 (Sup.
Ct. 1946).
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as one used for other purposes. In deciding against this argument,
the court followed a well settled rule that has few exceptions.'
The problem first'arose in a New Jersey case in which the court
said that the clause " ... nor to use for any other purpose than a
saloon and dwelling" was clear-it merely meant that a different use
was prohibited; there was no compulsion to use continually.2
In Henry Rahr's Sons Co. v. Buckley,3 the covenant ".. . prem-
ises to be -used for the purpose of hotel and saloon and bathing
grounds.... It is further understood that if the party of the second
part [the lessee] ... shall use such premises or any part thereof con-
trary to the conditions herein contained . . . this lease shall be void
as to the party of the second part,, and the party of the first part [the
lessor], or his legal representatives shall be entitled to possession of
said premises." Again, though the wording was even stronger than
in the principal case, the court held that not using for any purpose
is not using contrary to the conditions of the lease. And so it has
been in almost every case of this type that has received appellate
consideration.4
These decisions are predicated on the belief that if the parties
to the agreement desired that there would be a forfeiture in the event
that the premises were not occupied, it was for them to unequivocally
state such in the contract. This reasoning, when viewed by itself, is
sound; however, there are two classes of exceptions to the general
rule that weaken its logic.
It has been held that where there is actual waste as a result of
the non-use, recovery of the premises is allowed.5 Similarly the
tenant binds himself to occupy when the rent is based upon a per-
centage of the sales or profits.6 Both of these flow from the courts'
construction of the contracts which found that from a reading of the
entire instruments the parties must have meant that the premises
were to be occupied.
1 For the exceptions see notes 5 and 6 infra.
2 McCormick v. Stephany, 57 N. J. Eq. 257, 41 Atl. 840 (1898), modified
o other grounds, 61 N. J. Eq. 208, 48 Atl. 25 (1901).
3 159 Wis. 589, 150 N. W. 994 (1915).
4 Majestic Co. v. Orpheum Circuit, 21 F. 2d 720 (C. C. A. 8th 1927);
Goldberg v. Pearl, 306 Ill. 436, 138 N. E. 141 (1923) ; Bruns & Schaffer Amuse-
ment Co. v. Conover, 111 N. J. L. 257, 168 At!. 304 (1933); Burdick v. Fuller,
199 App. Div. 94, 191 N. Y. Supp. 442 (3d Dep't 1921); Dougan v. H. J.
Grell Co., 174 Wis. 17, 182 N. W. 350 (1921).
5The plaintiff in the principal case unsuccessfully attempted to bring the
case within the holding of Asling v. McAllister-Fitzgerald Lumber Co., 120
Kan. 455, 244 Pac. 16 (1926).
6 Mayfair Operating Corp. v. Bessemer Properties, Inc., 150 Fla. 132,
7 So. 2d 342 (1942); Sinclair Refining Co. v. Giddens, 54 Ga. App. 69, 187
S. E. 201 (1936); Sinclair Refining Co. v. Davis, 47 Ga. App. 601, 171 S. E.
150 (1933); Selber Bros., Inc. v. Newstadts Shoe Stores, 194 La. 654, 194
So. 579 (1940); Cissna Loan Co. v. Baron, 149 Wash. 386, 270 Pac. 1022
(1928).
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It is extremely difficult to reconcile these decisions with the rea-
soning of the general rule, for there seems to be no adequate reason
why the parties are not to be charged with providing for such contin-
gencies when they contracted, as they were so charged in the pria-
cipal case. 7 It is equally probable that they would and should foresee
that there would be waste or loss in rent and profits in the event of
non-occupancy as they would and should foresee the many other fact
situations upon which the other actions were brought. On the other
hand, if the rule is too stringent and there are valid reasons for re-
laxing it as to waste and percentage rents then there are comparable
reasons for relaxing it in diverse situations such as that presented in
the principal case.
M. F. B., JR.
PROPERTY-INJUNCTION-RIGHT OF WAY-ADVERSE PossES-
SION-STATUTE OF FRAUDS-Plaintiff and defendants own adjoining
parcels of land. These two pieces of property were owned by one
individual in 1891. Subsequently, he subdivided the parcel and sold
the one now held by the plaintiff, retaining for himself the piece now
owned by defendants. This original owner continued to live on the
property, now defendants', for thirty years, during which time he
never claimed any right to use the path or driveway in the rear of
plaintiff's house. When he wished to use the path he asked the per-
mission of plaintiff's predecessor in title, and an oral arrangement
was made whereby he had the permission to use it as long as he did
not interfere with the owner's use. This arrangement existed until
the original ownei' conveyed the property to another predecessor of
defendants' title, in 1923, who continued to use the plaintiff's path
or driveway for the same purposes, without any claim of right or
interest in the driveway. None of the deeds in defendants' chain
of title contain any grant of, or reference to, this right of way now
claimed by defendants.
Plaintiff erected a barricade across the land in dispute and the
defendants tore the barricade down three times. Plaintiff now brings
action against defendants for an injunction restraining defendants
from using lands in the immediate rear of plaintiff's house as a right
of way and for damages. Held, judgment for plaintiff, granting an
injunction and recovery of damages for repair of barricade. Cobb
v. Avery, - Misc. -, 75 N. Y. S. 2d 803 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
The defendants based their defense upon two premises. They
claimed that they had acquired a right of way across the premises of
7 Yet the court arbitrarily said in the principal case that the result would
be different if it had fallen into either of the exceptions. Congressional Amuse-
ment Corporation v. Weltman, 55 A. 2d 95, 96 (1947).
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